A Person Re-identification based Misidentification-proof Person Following Service Robot
Two years ago, I attended a robot contest, in which one of the missions required the robot to follow the pedestrian to complete the task. At that time, I used their demo program to complete the task. Not long after, I found two main issues: 1. The program follows the closest point read by the depth camera, which if I walk close to a wall next to, the robot may likely ‘follow’ the wall. 2. Not to mention if another pedestrian crosses between the robot and the target. Regarding these two issues, I decided to improve it. We’ve designed a procedure of using YOLO Object Detection and Person re-identification to re-identify the target for continuous following.
A Person Re-identification based Misidentification-proof Person Following Service Robot
Two years ago, I attended a robot contest, in which one of the missions required the robot to follow the pedestrian to complete the task. At that time, I used their demo program to complete the task. Not long after, I found two main issues: 1. The program follows the closest point read by the depth camera, which if I walk close to a wall next to, the robot may likely ‘follow’ the wall. 2. Not to mention if another pedestrian crosses between the robot and the target. Regarding these two issues, I decided to improve it. We’ve designed a procedure of using YOLO Object Detection and Person re-identification to re-identify the target for continuous following.
Limited Query Black-box Adversarial Attacks in the Real World
We study the creation of physical adversarial examples, which are robust to real-world transformations, using a limited number of queries to the target black-box neural networks. We observe that robust models tend to be especially susceptible to foreground manipulations, which motivates our novel Foreground attack. We demonstrate that gradient priors are a useful signal for black-box attacks and therefore introduce an improved version of the popular SimBA. We also propose an algorithm for transferable attacks that selects the most similar surrogates to the target model. Our black-box attacks outperform state-of-the-art approaches they are based on and support our belief that the concept of model similarity could be leveraged to build strong attacks in a limited-information setting.
HoneySurfer: Intelligent Web-Surfing Honeypots
In Singapore’s evolving cyber landscape, 96% of organisations have suffered at least one cyber attack and 95% of organisations have been reporting more sophisticated attacks in the frame of one year according to a 2019 report[1] by Carbon Black. As such, more tools must be utilised to counter increasingly refined attacks performed by malicious actors. Honeypots are effective tools for studying and mitigating these attacks. They work as decoy systems, typically deployed alongside real systems to capture and log the activities of the attacker. These systems are useful as they can actively detect potential attacks, help cybersecurity specialists study an attacker’s tactics and even misdirect attackers from their intended targets. Honeypots can be classified into two main categories: 1. Low-interaction honeypots merely emulate network services and internet protocols, allowing for limited interaction with the attacker. 2. High-interaction honeypots emulate operating systems, allowing for much more interaction with the attacker. Although honeypots are powerful tools, its value diminishes when its true identity is uncovered by attackers. This is especially so with attackers becoming more skilled through system fingerprinting or analysing network traffic from targets and hence, hindering honeypots from capturing more experienced attackers. While substantial research has been done to defend against system fingerprinting scans (see 1.1 Related Work), not much has been done to defend against network traffic analysis. As pointed out by Symantec[2][3], when attackers attempt to sniff network traffic of the system in question, the lack of network traffic raises a red flag, increasing the likelihood of the honeypot’s true identity being discovered. In addition, the main concern with regards to honeypot deployment being their ability to attract and engage attackers for a substantial period of time, an increased ability to interest malicious actors is invaluable. Producing human-like network activity on a honeypot would appeal to more malicious actors. Hence, this research aims to build an intelligent web-surfer which can learn and thus simulate human web-surfing behaviour, creating evidence of human network activities to disguise the identity of honeypots as production systems and luring in more attackers interested in packet sniffing for malicious purposes.